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Pitcairn Island with only 45 inhabitants. 
Of the 9.7 million people who inhabit the 
551,500 km2 land area of Oceania, just 
over two-thirds are in PNG.
Classical political science questions 
have been addressed in strikingly different 
ways across the region—whether to accom- 
modate ethnic diversity through unitary, 
devolved or federal systems; whether to 
handle conflict through majoritarian or pro-
portional electoral systems and/or through 
power sharing arrangements, and wheth-
er to adopt parliamentary or presiden-
tial systems or, as in Kiribati and in the 
autonomous region of Bougainville, some 
hybrid between the two. Other important 
questions for the region have been how 
to meld traditional forms of governance 
with imported institutions; how to respond 
to exceptionally low levels of women’s 
representation and how to build states in 
countries where—for many who live in rural 
areas and engage largely in subsistence 
cultivation—the state matters little. 
The Pacific Islands region includes entities 
closely incorporated with the metropolitan 
powers located around the Pacific Rim, 
such as Guam (USA), Rapa Nui (Chile) and 
Tokelau (New Zealand), as well as inde-
pendent states like Papua New Guinea, Fiji 
and Kiribati. The region includes countries 
that achieved independence less than thir-
ty years ago as well as those still in the 
process of adjustment to the post-colonial 
order. It includes resource-rich territories 
with strong potential for integration into the 
world economy alongside chronically 
resource-poor countries with limited ave-
nues for export-driven economic growth. 
It includes territories with open access to 
metropolitan labour markets, and countries 
without. It includes an extraordinary ethno-
linguistic diversity, mostly in Melanesia, 
which alone accounts for one-fifth of the 
world’s documented living languages.2 It 
includes relatively big nations like PNG 
(6.6 million) alongside tiny micro-states 
like Niue, which has a population of only 
1,500, and minute dependent territories like 
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rElAtIONshIp tO 
mEtrOpOlItAN pOwErs
Close integration of territories with metropoli-
tan powers is a legacy of the colonial expe-
rience. Hawai‘i became the fiftieth Pacific 
state in 1959, while other American Pacific 
territories—Guam, American Samoa, and 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas 
(CNMI)—are described by the US Supreme 
Court as having become “appurtenant to but 
not a part of the United States” (Underwood 
2006: 7). Rapa Nui was annexed in 1888 but 
only legally absorbed into Chile’s Valparaiso 
Province in 1966. Residence on the island 
by Chileans is still restricted as is acquisi-
tion of property by those not of Rapa Nui 
descent. By contrast, after West Papua was 
absorbed into Indonesia with United Nations 
(UN) approval after the “Act of Free Choice” 
in 1969, a mixture of spontaneous and 
sponsored transmigration brought in three 
quarters of a million people, mainly from the 
islands of Java and Sulawesi. Integration 
with a powerful neighbour tends to open the 
floodgates to settlement, as on Saipan (Com-
monwealth of the Northern Marianas) where 
the majority were non-indigenes in 2000, 
mostly from the Philippines or China. 
New Caledonia, French Polynesia and 
Wallis and Futuna, are in law, part of the 
French nation-state; all participate in elections 
for the national assembly and the Presidency. 
The CFP franc, the currency in all three 
territories, is pegged to the euro. In 1958, 
French President General Charles de Gaulle 
insisted on the doctrine of the “one and 
indivisible republic”, and forced voters in 
French Polynesia to choose between colonial 
integration or abrupt secession. Sixty-four per 
cent voted in favour of staying with France. 
The pro-independence movement was 
defeated, and after disturbances in Papeete, 
its leader, Pouvanaa a Oopa, was imprisoned 
(Henningham 1992: 123–26). The peoples 
of the French Pacific remain confronted with 
those stark options, although in modified 
forms: since 2003 they may opt to become 
“territorial collectivities”, with considerable 
autonomy. French Polynesia went a step 
further by adopting its own autonomy statute. 
New Caledonia is unique: as a result of the 
1998 Noumea Accord, the territory has special 
legislative powers and a schedule for phased 
expansion of domestic political control ahead 
of a referendum on independence between 
2014–2019. To agree to that accord entailed 
such a rupture with the doctrine of indivisibility 
of the Republic that France had to hold a 
nationwide referendum, the result of which 
earned New Caledonia a special provision in 
the constitution (Maclellan 2005: 397). 
Of the sixteen territories in the 
world that remain on the UN list of non- 
decolonized territories, the Pacific accounts 
for five—American Samoa, Guam, New 
Caledonia, Pitcairn Island and Tokelau. Nei-
ther of Tokelau’s two referenda (2006 and 
2007) on whether to become self-governing 
achieved the required two-thirds majority, 
and Pitcairn Island’s links with Britain have, 
if anything, been reinforced by adjudication 
of child abuses cases by the British Privy 
Council. American military build up on Guam 
in the new millennium makes independence 
less likely, despite longstanding Chamorro 
disquiet about existing arrangements. Inclu-
sion on, or exclusion from, the UN list can 
prove highly controversial, with behind-the-
scenes manoeuvring at the UN headquarters 
in New York or Geneva being used to exert 
leverage towards independence back home. 
The incentives are clear. In 2008, UN Secre-
tary General Ban Ki-moon urged the world 
“to complete the decolonization process in 
every one of the remaining sixteen Non-Self-
Governing Territories”.3 Pro-independence 
leader Oscar Temaru, after his initial election 
as French Polynesia’s President in 2004, 
sought to get his country onto the UN list fol-
lowing the precedent set by New Caledonia 
in the wake of the 1980s Kanak uprising. 
Samoa was the first of the Pacific Island 
states to secure independence in 1962, and 
the unique constitutional arrangements cho-
sen at that time (discussed later) have prob-
ably contributed to that country’s postcolonial 
stability. Tonga formally became independent 
in 1970, but here the colonial hand was, for 
the most part, light. Financial irregularities 
under King George Tupou II (1893–1918) led 
the British colonists to demand closer control 
(Fusitu’a & Rutherford 1977: 180). Britain 
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the Santo rebellion in 1980 was the most 
severe of the secessionist crises accompa-
nying independence anywhere in the Pacific 
region: Jimmy Stevens’ Vemerana Provision-
al Government on Santo threatened to break 
up the emerging state, until the rebellion was 
halted by the deployment of British, French, 
and Papua New Guinean troops. The only 
actual case of secession in Oceania was 
exceptionally peaceful: in 1976, the British 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands decided to go their 
separate ways and a few years later became 
independent as Kiribati (1979) and Tuvalu 
(1978).5 Bougainville’s decade-long conflict 
first with PNG and then internally is the most 
severe of the modern-day secessionist dis-
putes. Its peace settlement, like that of the 
New Caledonian crisis of the 1980s, included 
a central provision that delayed the decision 
on independence for at least a decade.6  
In between the extremes of independence 
and incorporation, the Pacific Islands are 
host to a range of hybrid political arrange-
ments between island territories and former 
colonial rulers. New Zealand experimented 
with Compacts of Free Association with Niue 
and the Cook Islands. Palau, the Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands entered Compacts of Free 
Association with the US that gave them con-
siderable autonomy (allowing them, unlike 
Cook Islands and Niue, to join the UN), 
but left the US with “strategic denial” rights 
enabling the exclusion of other rival super-
powers powers from establishing military 
bases in that American sphere of influence. 
As a result of an associated deal, missiles 
can be fired from Vandenberg air base in 
California across a 6,760 km arc through the 
Pacific sky before plunging into the lagoon of 
Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. From 
there, they can be retrieved and studied by 
US scientists working at the nearby Ronald 
Reagan Ballistic Missile Defence Test Site. 
For this, Kwajalein’s chiefs—including former 
President Imata Kabua—receive substantial 
rental payments, only a fraction of which 
trickles down to the Ebeye indigenous settle-
ment adjacent to the American base. Nego-
tiations around a new land use agreement 
for Kwajalein remain an issue of contention 
between Kwajalein chiefs and the Majuro-
became preoccupied with Europe during the 
1914–1918 war, and on its heels the Great 
Depression enabled Tupou II’s more capable 
successor Queen Salote to preserve Tonga’s 
political autonomy. Fiji’s independence was 
inevitably problematic because of the need 
to reconcile the competing aspirations of the 
majority Fiji Indian and minority indigenous 
Fijian leaders (Norton 2004). Ethnic Fijian 
claims that since the country had been ceded 
to Queen Victoria by their chiefs in 1874 it 
should now be returned to those indigenous 
chiefs were to become a rallying cry of the 
ethno-nationalists who overthrew elected 
governments in 1987 and 2000. Fiji Indian 
claims that the communally based electoral 
system left as a compromise by the British 
at independence perpetuated race-based 
voting were to become a prominent theme of 
the military-backed interim government that 
emerged in the wake of Fiji’s third coup in 
December 2006. 
Constitutional choices made at indepen-
dence also had enduring implications else-
where in the region, in contrast to Africa 
where initial legal frameworks bequeathed 
by colonial powers were often torn up and 
new arrangements adopted (Chazan 1992). 
Depth of consultation made a difference 
to the political authority of whatever struc-
tures were chosen. PNG (1975) and Kiribati 
(1979) used constitutional conventions for 
deliberation which left recommendations that 
had lasting political legitimacy (Macdonald 
1982). By contrast, although there was more 
local consultation than is often appreciated 
in Solomon Islands, the 1978 Independence 
Order dealt with issues of citizenship in ways 
that pleased the British Colonial Office and 
swelled the size of the golden handshake, 
but provided no durable answer to what was 
to become a perennial issue in Solomon 
Islands politics: how to balance the powers 
of the central government against those of 
the separate islands.4 The western break-
away movement that emerged in 1978 was 
echoed by demands for devolution during 
a constitutional review a decade later, and 
then again in the wake of the June 2000 coup 
when many provinces threatened to secede 
from the nation (Premdas et al. 1984; Mama-
loni 1988; Fraenkel 2004: 182). In Vanuatu, 
  Oceania’s Political Institutions and Transitions
4
based Marshallese government. Washington 
pragmatically extended its 17 December 
2008 deadline for achieving agreement over 
Kwajalein for a further five years. 
For the Marshall Islands and Federated 
States of Micronesia, the 1986 Compacts of 
Free Association expired in 2001. They were 
extended two years before being renewed for 
a further 20-year period in 2003, although now 
with greater scrutiny by the US Department 
of the Interior. Palau commenced its fifteen-
year compact later than its neighbours in 
1994, and so the arrangement expired 
only in 2009. US Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton agreed a one-year extension and 
“compact review” talks commenced in May 
2009. Renewed compacts provide the US-
associated states with sizeable additions to 
government revenue—US$3.2 billion over 
the 20 years for the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM) and the Marshall Islands. 
They also give access to costly federal 
programs, for example in health, education 
and the US mainland postal service. 
Atomic rents kept French Polynesia pros-
perous for many years. Between 1966 and 
1975, 41 atmospheric tests were conducted 
on the remote atolls of Mururoa and Fan-
gataufa, followed by 137 underground tests 
ending in 1996, when France signed the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
French aid then declined, but it still accounts 
for 35 per cent of French Polynesian GDP. 
Due to French finance, New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia easily have the highest 
income per capita in the Pacific. For the 
American nuclear-affected islands, indepen-
dence comes at a price. The Marshall Islands 
earned global notoriety because of the Bravo 
nuclear test on Bikini Atoll in 1954. In total, 
67 tests were carried out on Bikini and 
neighbouring Enewetak between 1946 and 
1958, the effects of which spread eastwards 
to Rongelap and Utrik. Washington insists 
that the US$250 million paid to the Marshal-
lese Nuclear Claims Tribunal under the first 
compact, and the similar amount paid for 
federal programs to affected victims, was “full 
and final” compensation. The Marshallese 
government disagrees. MPs representing 
the nuclear-affected islands have at times 
made common cause with Kwajalein’s chiefs 
to urge a more belligerent negotiating stance 
over the new compact and the land use 
agreement for the Ronald Reagan Ballistic 
Missile Defence Test Site. 
The economic advantages of close inte-
gration with a wealthy metropolitan power 
are everywhere apparent; the independent 
states are, on average, poorer than those that 
have been incorporated by powerful neigh-
bours around the Pacific Rim or those that 
have retained close ties with former colonial 
powers (Bertram 1999: 114). For many in the 
French territories, “free association” arrange-
ments such as those that connect Pacific 
states to America and New Zealand would 
be preferable to the controls from Paris, but 
the conventional French government posi-
tion, echoing the Gaullist doctrine of 1958, is 
to insist that postcolonial linkages can only 
be decided after the territory settles upon 
independence. Financial incentives thus act 
as strong deterrents to loosening ties, even 
if such marked internal inequalities exist that 
indigenous groups still back political parties 
who push for independence. 
ElECtOrAl systEms
Oceania has a history of electoral experi-
mentation. Enthusiasm for preferential voting 
in the Pacific has been encouraged by Aus-
tralia’s adoption of the alternative vote (AV) 
for the federal parliament in 1918. Colonially 
inherited first-past-the-post systems have 
been ditched in favour of single-member pref-
erential systems in Fiji and PNG, although 
in both cases without the expected results 
(Fraenkel & Grofman 2006; May 2008). In 
Fiji, the alleged “unfairness” of outcomes 
under the AV system was used to justify 
coups both in 2000 and 2006. When it was 
adopted in the mid-1990s, AV was intended 
to boost the chances of the moderate cen-
trists, and to disadvantage ethnic extremists. 
Instead, it triggered a sharpening of electoral 
polarization. Nauru has a unique simultane-
ously tallied preferential voting system which 
oddly resembles the arrangements invented 
by nineteenth-century French mathematician 
Jean-Charles de Borda (Reilly 2001). Kiri-
bati has a two-round system similar to that 
   Oceania’s Political Institutions and Transitions
5
in mainland France, although unusually it is 
used in multi-member constituencies. That 
system permits voters to express preferenc-
es, although over two rounds rather than in a 
single-round of AV voting.7 It is also consider-
ably simpler to administer and count than the 
AV system, even if the need for two elections 
inevitably raises administrative costs. 
List proportional representation (PR) sys-
tems are used only in the French territories. 
Unlike majoritarian systems, list PR systems 
aim to make the share of seats won by each 
party roughly equivalent to its share of votes, 
although there is a five per cent threshold 
below which parties gain no seats at all. 
By definition, list PR requires multi-member 
constituencies. New Caledonia, for example, 
is divided into three constituencies: the south 
(with 32 seats), the north (with 15) and the 
Loyalty Islands (with 7) for elections to the 
54-member territorial congress. Voters sim-
ply tick the ballot paper next to their favoured 
political party, and the parties submit lists of 
their candidates in order of preference. After 
the votes are tallied, electoral officials calcu-
late which members are elected according 
to each party’s share of the vote. In 2004, 
President Gaston Flosse modified French 
Polynesia’s list PR voting system so as to 
give a 30 per cent seat bonus to the winning 
party, thus deliberately removing the system’s 
proportionality. His aim was to give his Taho-
eraa Huiraatira Party a stable working major-
ity and to end many years of dependence 
on coalition government. The result was a 
crashing defeat for Tahoeraa Huiraatira, and 
the election instead of pro-independence 
leader Oscar Temaru. Instead of opening an 
era of stability, French Polynesia entered a 
politically chaotic period, with the presidency 
switching back and forth between the various 
factions. Paris stepped in to squash Flosse’s 
failed reform in 2007. 
Vanuatu is one of the few countries in the 
world to still use the single non-transferable 
vote (SNTV) system, alongside Jordan and 
Afghanistan. In an effort to bind francophone 
secessionists into the emerging Vanuatu 
state, British and French colonial authorities 
agreed on SNTV in the hope of avoiding a 
clean sweep for Walter Lini’s anglophone 
Vanua’aku Pati (VP). Under SNTV, voters 
have a single vote, but constituencies have 
multiple members. Thus, if there is a 40 per 
cent francophone minority in a three-seat 
constituency, and if francophones avoid split-
ting their votes, they should be able to pick 
up at least one of the three seats. The sys-
tem achieved its objective reasonably well 
in the initial elections after independence, 
when the parties were reasonably disciplined 
and the contest was a bipolar one between 
the VP and the francophone Union of Moder-
ate Parties. From the late 1980s, however, 
the francophone/anglophone cleavage faded 
in significance, and parties splintered (Van 
Trease 2005). An increasing number of can-
didates contested elections, a feature also 
witnessed in other neighbouring Melanesian 
countries. As political parties have multiplied, 
SNTV has become less predictable, and has 
been described as resembling “the nearest 
[thing] the electoral system world possesses 
to a fruit machine” (Ellis 2006). 
Principles of universal suffrage and voter 
equality have, in some parts of the Pacific, 
sat awkwardly alongside traditional systems 
of authority. In Tonga, the King has not 
been—as often characterised—an absolutist 
monarch. Tonga’s kings have been bound 
by the 1875 Constitution. It is the weak pow-
ers of parliament that have set Tonga apart 
from its neighbours. The Prime Minister and 
Cabinet have been selected directly by the 
King, and sat in the legislature alongside nine 
nobles and nine people’s representatives. 
Although there has been universal adult suf-
frage, there has been no effort to achieve 
voter equality: the holders of 33 noble titles 
selected nine noble representatives, while 
the rest of Tonga’s 100,000 people chose 
nine people’s representatives. Commitment 
to change has been in the air since 2005, 
oddly preceding the riots that destroyed 
much of Nuku’alofa in late 2006. In 2005, 
for the first time one of the people’s repre-
sentatives, Dr Feleti Sevele, became Prime 
Minister. The King subsequently declined to 
overrule Dr Sevele’s choice of cabinet min-
isters. Upon his coronation in 2008, the new 
King, George Tupou V, committed to a major-
ity popularly elected parliament. Parliament 
settled upon a first-past-the-post system, and 
elections for the country’s first ever major-
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ity popularly elected assembly took place in 
November 2010.
The principle of universal suffrage was 
not accepted by the architects of Samoa’s 
1962 constitution. Initially, both voters and 
candidates had to be holders of matai titles 
(a term often misleadingly translated as 
“chief”, but possibly better translated as 
“family head”). A visiting UN team in 1959 
argued that since there was an internal 
family decision-making process prior to the 
award of matai titles, the Samoan system 
could be regarded as one of “election at 
two stages” (So’o & Fraenkel, 2005: 335). 
During the 1980s, that system was widely 
perceived—within Samoa—to have led to a 
proliferation of matai titles, triggered by rival 
parties exploiting the constitution’s incentives 
to expand their voter bases by awarding 
titles. In 1990, there were 21,649 such titles, 
almost double the level a decade earlier. In 
that same year, the country voted to shift to 
a universal suffrage, although retaining the 
matai-only qualification for candidates. The 
change had several important repercussions 
for Samoan politics, but it did not halt the 
multiplication in the number of matai titles. 
In 1999, over 35,000 matai titles were on the 
books of the Land and Titles Court (So’o & 
Fraenkel, 2005: 342). 
prEsIdENtIAl Or 
pArlIAmENtAry systEms 
The Pacific’s presidential systems have been 
largely in the north where the US influ-
ence exerts greatest sway. Freely associated 
Palau most closely resembles the US model, 
with a president and congress and even a 
miniature replica of Washington’s Capitol 
building. The Commonwealth of the North-
ern Marianas, Guam and American Samoa 
have governors, rather than presidents, but 
are faithful to the American model in having 
direct popular elections for the head of gov-
ernment. The Marshall Islands and Nauru 
depart from the pattern in having “presidents” 
that are more like Prime Ministers in the 
Westminster system; they are elected by 
parliaments. Kiribati is a unique hybrid since 
although it has a directly elected President 
(i) the nominees for the presidential election 
are selected through a complex parliamen-
tary ballot; (ii) the president must form his 
cabinet from within parliament; and (iii) the 
president, despite being directly elected, can 
be ousted by a no-confidence vote within 
parliament, but doing this precipitates a gen-
eral dissolution of parliament. Those choices 
are aimed at lessening the possibility of grid-
lock between an unpopular President and a 
hostile parliament, diminishing the likelihood 
of mid-term removal of the head of state 
and giving the head of government a direct 
popular mandate. As a result, Kiribati has 
experienced much less political instability 
than neighbours like Tuvalu and Nauru.
In the Pacific parliamentary systems, 
government formation can entail a delicate 
balancing act. In Solomon Islands, form-
ing a cabinet has always entailed a care-
ful harmonizing of representation from the 
most populous island of Malaita with that 
from Guadalcanal and the Western Province. 
Oddly, this has at times benefited politicians 
from none of those three provinces, such as 
three-time Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni 
(from Makira) or 2001–2006 Prime Minister 
Sir Allen Kemakeza (from Savo), who could 
appear to stand above the fray. In PNG, 
it is inconceivable that a cabinet should 
exclude representatives from the highlands, 
or Papua or the islands. Even in Fiji, which 
in many respects departs from Melanesian 
political norms owing to its bipolar indigene-
Indian cleavage, cautious inclusion of power-
ful regions becomes politically astute. When 
Laisenia Qarase sought to forge a power-
sharing government with the Fiji Labour 
Party in May 2006, he was careful to secure 
his indigenous Fijian base by drawing in par-
amount chiefs from the Kubuna, Burebasaga 
and Tovata confederacies. The neglect of 
the Tongan-influenced Lau Islands, already 
suffering from a fading of the former glory 
associated with the deceased Ratu Mara’s 
years as Prime Minister and then President, 
proved to be that government’s Achilles 
Heel. The revenge of Mara’s descendants, 
or rather the husbands of his daughters, was 
to become an important aspect of the coup of 
December 2006.8  
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Romantics often criticise the colonial 
imposition of Westminster and see this as 
having disturbed traditional styles of politi-
cal organisation which were, it is claimed, 
characterised by consensus, and the “Pacific 
way”.9 Yet the cleavages that prevail across 
the Pacific between government and opposi-
tion are not mere reflections of inherited insti-
tutions. In the small close-knit micro-states, 
hostility between the government faction and 
the opposition leadership can on occasions 
become far more bitter than in the indus-
trialised mass democracies (even though 
alliances can also, in other circumstances, 
become fluid and personality-based, and 
many opposition leaders will, have some 
point, served as ministers together in cabi-
net with those who are now adversaries). 
Opposition leaders may find themselves out 
of government for consecutive parliamen-
tary terms, rendering them vulnerable in their 
home constituencies. Government victories 
are carried beyond the floor of the parlia-
mentary chamber affecting, for example, 
opposition leaders’ private business interests 
or the promotion prospects of those in their 
kin groups. When a chance presents itself to 
dislodge such governments (either through 
a no-confidence vote or a prime ministe-
rial election), opposition leaders can become 
desperate, and willing to make deals they 
would otherwise prefer not to make with 
wavering opportunists. That sharp rivalry 
amongst Pacific leaders is not, as often imag-
ined, a mere reflection of colonially inherited 
institutions can be seen by the regular legal 
contestation of imposed limits on Prime 
Ministerial power (for example, Billy Hilly, 
Solomon Islands, 1993; Saufatu Sopoanga, 
Tuvalu, 2002 and Serge Vohor, Vanuatu, 
2004, to name but a few). 
Absence of major ideological cleavages 
or political parties with a substantial extra-
parliamentary membership can give Pacific 
parliamentarians considerable freedom for 
manoeuvre. Occupying a ministerial portfolio 
not only provides a salary and status that is 
often impossible for a local to equal in the 
private sector, it also provides access to state 
funds and state leverage over foreign con-
trolled resource-extractive industries. Par-
ticularly in Melanesia, MPs have been known 
to engage in spectacular changes in affinity 
as they cross the floor to join government, 
often justifying this by claiming—probably 
accurately—that they were not elected to 
government in order to remain on the opposi-
tion benches. Many outside cabinet in PNG 
have preferred to sit on the “middle benches” 
poised between government and opposi-
tion, so as to be open to offers of ministe-
rial portfolios but equally accessible to being 
courted by opposition schemers planning 
assembly of a new government. Regular no- 
confidence votes in Solomon Islands are 
popularly believed to be money-making 
schemes: even if they do not succeed, the 
MPs all round earn large sums of cash as 
recipients of rival factions’ bids for political 
support. After Vanuatu’s 2008 Prime Minis-
terial election, two MPs were inadvertently 
heard live on national radio talking about the 
amounts of cash that had exchanged hands, 
unaware that the microphone was still turned 
on (Van Trease 2009). 
Pacific parliamentarians, although not 
constrained by powerful party machines, 
may nevertheless be pressured by local 
constituents, wantoks or urban networks. 
The threat of electoral annihilation haunts 
Western Melanesian incumbents, who 
generally experience turnover rates well 
above 50 per cent. Politicians in Kiribati 
are intensely sensitive to home island 
opinion: while debate on government tabled 
legislation commands slender interest, 
question time—when MPs can be heard 
live on national radio interrogating ministers 
about matters of local significance—attracts 
intense interest. Popular engagement in 
parliamentary processes may be weak, but 
public interest is strong. When the Marshall 
Islands Nitijela is in session, most shared 
taxis running down Majuro’s main street will 
be tuned into the debates. During the 1998–
1999 struggles between the Kessai Note’s 
United Democratic Party (UDP) and former 
President Imata Kabua, the public gallery of 
the Nitijela was packed with onlookers. Jousts 
between government and opposition leaders 
in Samoa can likewise grip public attention. 
Voter turnout is far higher in the Pacific 
Islands than in North America or Western 
Europe, and would be higher still if duplicate 
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or deceased voter registrations were deleted 
from the rolls. Popular engagement with 
politics is greater than often recognised in the 
Pacific Islands, even if popular participation 
in decision-making (e.g. through select 
committees) is weak and accountability 
mechanisms work only through the crude 
three- to five-yearly ditching of incumbents at 
each general election. 
pOlItICAl pArtIEs ANd 
INtEgrIty lEgIslAtION
Nowhere in the Pacific Islands have the 
popularly based political parties that are 
so central to conventional western political 
thinking emerged. Left–right ideological 
cleavages do not anywhere shape the divide 
between government and opposition. The 
only Pacific Island territories with fairly robust 
political parties are Fiji and New Caledonia, 
although Vanuatu and French Polynesia have 
some history of political party organisation.10 
Ever since independence in Fiji, there has 
been one party that appeals to the vast 
majority of ethnic Fijians11 and another that 
represents the Fiji Indians.12 The Fijian 
party has stood little chance in the Indian-
dominated constituencies and vice versa. 
In 1997, when Fiji abandoned the first-past-
the-post system in favour of the AV system, 
politicians were persuaded that adopting this 
modified majoritarian system would be most 
likely to encourage multi-ethnic government. 
That proved false. Over the three elections 
under AV, the party system polarized, so that 
by the third election under the system in 2006 
one party claimed 80 per cent of the ethnic 
Fijian vote, while the other had 80 per cent 
of the Indian vote. Despondency as a result 
of the failure of the AV system to generate 
anticipated pro-moderation outcomes helps 
to explain why former centrist politicians and 
associated civil society activists sympathised 
with the military coup of December 2006, 
even if their choice to do so only legitimised 
Bainimarama’s power grab. 
In New Caledonia, issue-based political 
polarization has also proved sharp, but not on 
the ethnic pattern of Fiji. Rivalry in the 1980s 
between the Front de Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) and the French 
loyalist Rassemblement pour la Calédonie 
dans la Republique (RPCR) was intense, but 
ethnicity was not coterminous with political 
allegiance. Some indigenous Kanaks backed 
the RPCR, while the pro-independence par-
ties always obtained at least some support 
outside their core Melanesian voter base. 
The Noumea Accord process in New Caledo-
nia may also have served to erode the bipo-
lar divide, in the sense that parties on both 
sides have fractured politically. Institutional 
incentives took the heat off the bipolar con-
flict, and permitted the political emergence of 
alternative currents of opinion. The territory 
had long used a closed list proportional rep-
resentation system, but in the 1998 Noumea 
Accord supplemented also proportionality 
in the formation of cabinet through manda-
tory power-sharing rules. The 1998 deal also 
devolved power to the provincial assemblies. 
The contrast between the experience of Fiji 
and New Caledonia illustrates the perils of 
using majoritarian systems in bipolar societ-
ies with race-based voting. 
Few Pacific states have witnessed a 
strengthening of political party-style organi-
sation. In the Marshall Islands, Kessai Note’s 
UDP administration was elected in 1999 on a 
“good governance”, accountability and trans-
parency platform ousting Imata Kabua’s gov-
ernment. The UDP government survived the 
2003 election, but by 2007 was confronted 
by a rival party that was backed by Imata 
Kabua and other leading chiefly families in 
the Ralik chain, the Aelon Kein Ad (AKA). 
The AKA struck a deal with Nitijela speaker, 
and Ratak chief, Litokwa Tomeing, and won 
the 2007 election. Despite the appearance 
of an “evolution” towards political party-style 
organisation, allegiances remain fluid in the 
Marshall Islands. The triumph of the “vision-
aries” against the “old guard” in Nauru in 
2004 was not accompanied by development 
of political parties; the reformist’s access to 
political power always depended on court-
ing wavering opportunists with offers of the 
presidency. In the smaller Pacific states, a 
hardening of the opposition often entails the 
formation of a political party but, if successful 
in obtaining office, the new government will 
usually prefer to decry political party-style 
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organisation and claim instead to be ruling in 
the general interest.
Towards the western Pacific, the absence 
of robust political parties has become a 
major issue, leading in some countries to 
ambitious legislation aimed at encouraging 
the construction of party-based systems. 
PNG’s 2001–2002 Organic Law on Political 
Parties and Candidates (OLIPACC) aimed 
to fast-track the development of strong 
parties by requiring those who back a Prime 
Minister after a general election to stick 
with that choice in any votes of confidence, 
budgetary votes and votes on constitutional 
amendments. In an effort to avoid the horse-
trading that follows each general election, 
the party with the largest share of votes is 
to be given the first opportunity to form a 
government. 
That legislation is widely believed to have 
ushered in a period of greater stability in 
PNG; Sir Michael Somare’s National Alliance 
government survived a full 2002–2007 term 
in office, the first government since indepen-
dence to have achieved this. Somare also 
succeeded in getting re-elected for a further 
term after the general election in 2007, and 
survived beyond the eighteen-month grace 
period that ended in February 2009. Yet 
there are doubts about this simplistic assess-
ment of the stabilising merits of OLIPPAC. 
While the Prime Minister remained Somare, 
deputy prime ministers changed repeatedly 
over 2002–2007, and ministers were regu-
larly reshuffled. Contrary to the rules against 
floor-crossing, eleven MPs switched sides 
from government to opposition during the 
2002–2007 parliament, but none lost their 
seats as the law said they should do. The 
Ombudsman—who was in law empowered 
to act in such cases, if necessary to recom-
mend a forfeit of seats—wisely preferred not 
to do so. The law proved a toothless tiger, 
even if in practice floor-crossing did diminish 
due to the perception of the threat of dis-
missal. Opposition inside parliament became 
subdued not so much because of OLIPPAC 
but because of the presence of a partisan 
speaker who closed down hostile debate 
and ruled out of order questions that might 
embarrass the government. In July 2010, 
PNG’s Supreme Court ruled that key ele-
ments of the OLIPPAC violated the freedom 
of movement provisions in the constitution.13 
Despite this, the myth of OLIPPAC-
engineered stability obtained considerable 
currency, for there could be little doubt that 
the political order was more stable than 
during the chaotic turn-of-the-millennium 
years (Standish 2000). The more plausible 
explanation was better handling of the 
country’s second resources boom (Baton et 
al 2009), and the availability of a good deal 
more money to grease the political wheels. 
Other Melanesian countries have been 
inspired by the PNG experiment, hoping 
also to discipline their allegedly feckless and 
unruly backbenchers. Serge Vohor’s short-
lived 2004 government in Vanuatu wanted to 
introduce PNG-like “grace periods”, but the 
court ruled the attempt unconstitutional, and 
Vohor’s government fell to a no confidence 
challenge. In Solomon Islands, the post 
2007 Sikua-led government was assisted by 
Australian think-tanks in deliberations aimed 
at adopting legislation inspired by OLIPPAC 
in PNG.14 However, several ministers in 
Dr Sikua’s cabinet conspired against the 
proposed constitutional amendment, which 
failed to obtain the required two-thirds 
majority. Those ministers were sacked by 
Dr Sikua for this act of rebellion, but they 
re-emerged, holding key portfolios, in the 
government led by new Prime Minister Danny 
Philip after the August 2010 election. 
In PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 
bills and laws have been ostensibly aimed at 
beefing up political parties, but in practice at 
strengthening governments and weakening 
the opposition. Grace periods during which 
governments cannot be voted out of office 
tend to be much more popular than financing 
a costly political party registration apparatus. 
Although popular concern centres on the 
horse-trading prior to Prime Ministerial elec-
tions, the rule giving the largest party the 
first crack at forming a government—by mak-
ing this a one-shot game—generates even 
greater potential for corruption and instability 
than the previous arrangements. The risk 
with “grace periods”, and other forms of 
restriction on “no confidence” motions, is that 
they allow a deeply unpopular government to 
retain office, and/or that they require the law 
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courts to intervene to control the minutiae of 
parliamentary conduct. 
wOmEN’s rEprEsENtAtION
Of the nine countries worldwide that have 
zero women members of parliament, 
Oceania accounts for five (Solomon Islands, 
FSM, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu).15 PNG and 
the Marshall Islands have only a single 
female MP. Fiji had eight until Bainimarama 
dissolved parliament in December 2006. 
Samoa and Niue have four, Guam, Cook 
Islands and Kiribati have three, and Vanuatu 
two women MPs. Male dominance of 
the political stage occurs not only in the 
national parliaments, but also in local-level 
assemblies. Traditional male preponderance 
in the political sphere, and the conservatism 
of island societies, are the most frequently 
heard explanations for inequality in political 
representation. Yet change is in the air, at 
least in some parts of the Pacific. In western 
Melanesia, a growing number of women 
are now contesting elections. By contrast, 
in some of the smaller and more remote 
islands, few women contest and those that do 
are subjected to extraordinary pressures. In 
some Pacific Island polities, female leaders 
prefer to keep out of the male-dominated 
political world, and to concentrate instead 
on influencing decisions behind the scenes 
or through civil society activism (McCloud 
2002). Increasingly aggressive electoral 
contests have also diminished women’s 
chances on the campaign trail: in the PNG 
highlands, for example, candidates need 
access to large sums of cash to win, and 
they need large numbers of male campaign 
backers in order to sustain control over the 
polling booths and coordinate the process of 
“assisted voting” (i.e. the completion of ballot 
papers en masse by sympathisers). 
Temporary special measures have been 
used to increase the number of women in 
parliament in the French territories and on 
Bougainville. The French law on parity has 
given New Caledonia and French Polynesia 
close to 50 per cent female members of 
territorial assemblies. That law has not 
yielded similar results in the third-largest 
French territory, Wallis and Futuna, where 
constituencies are smaller and where 
numerous parties enter the contest. Although 
the parity law requires parties to lodge lists 
that alternate men and women, since most 
“parties” in Wallis and Futuna obtain only a 
single member the law does not have the 
intended effect. Adopting parity laws would 
have similar results in the other party-less 
Pacific microstates.16 Where political parties 
are absent or weak, reserved seats are 
the only legal measure likely to increase 
the number of women in parliament. The 
autonomous region of Bougainville is the sole 
entity in Oceania to have adopted reserved 
seats for women. Three of Bougainville’s 41 
seats are reserved for women. In both PNG 
and Solomon Islands, increasing numbers of 
female candidates are contesting elections, 
and in both countries there are pressures 
for reserved seats to increase the number of 
women in parliament. 
Although women are poorly represented 
in Pacific parliaments, they tend to be better 
represented at the top levels of the civil ser-
vice, where appointments are more likely to 
be on merit. Kiribati for example has only 3 
women in its 46 member parliament (6.5%), 
but 7 of the 15 top positions in the I-Kiribati 
civil service (46%) are occupied by females. 
In Solomon Islands, Nauru and Samoa, the 
percentage of women in top positions in the 
ministries is also markedly higher than the 
share in parliament. The secretaries in the 
I-Kiribati ministries are, probably uniquely 
in the Pacific, paid considerably more than 
parliamentarians. Much of the consultation 
around new legislation occurs through the 
ministries, prior to agreement in cabinet 
and before bills are tabled in parliament. In 
Kiribati, as in many other Pacific countries, 
highly qualified women prefer to take posi-
tions formulating and implementing policy, 
rather than going on the election campaign 
trail or joining male-dominated legislative 
assemblies. The Kiribati parliament is an 
assembly open to those over the civil service 
retirement age of 55, and it is a place where 
MPs focus largely on constituency matters 
rather than law making. 
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pOwEr-shArINg ACCOrds
The Pacific has an interesting but little inter-
nationally known experience with manda-
tory power-sharing accords. Nowhere in the 
world has witnessed such extensive litigation 
about mandatory power-sharing rules as Fiji. 
In the 1997 Fiji constitution, a power-sharing 
provision required that all parties with ten 
per cent or more of seats be proportionally 
represented in cabinet. The provision was 
modelled on that in South Africa during the 
transition from Apartheid, and similar rules 
were adopted in Northern Ireland as part of 
the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. When 
Mahendra Chaudhry formed his Labour-led 
People’s Coalition cabinet after the 1999 Fiji 
election, he proved able to exclude the larg-
est Fijian party, Rabuka’s Soqosoqo Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei, on the grounds that its 
leaders imposed conditions on cabinet entry 
that amounted to a decline of the invitation. 
When Chaudhry’s arch-adversary Laisenia 
Qarase tried to follow that legal precedent 
after the elections of 2001, the Court of 
Appeal rejected his efforts as contrary to 
the 1997 constitution. Qarase appealed, 
and the cases dragged on until 2004 before 
the Supreme Court left Qarase’s Soqosoqo 
Duavata ni Lewenivanua party with no option 
other than to invite Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour 
Party (FLP) into cabinet. Qarase reluctantly 
complied by offering the FLP a series of 
token minor portfolios in a cabinet so swol-
len that his former ministers also retained 
their portfolios. It was, unsurprisingly after 
so much legal action, a compromise with 
the letter but not the spirit of the law. The 
FLP condemned the expansion in cabinet 
size as a costly imposition on Fiji’s people 
and criticised the portfolios as trivial. Since 
a fresh election was anyway looming on the 
horizon, Chaudhry chose instead to occupy 
the opposition benches. 
After the 2006 election, Qarase complied 
more wholeheartedly with Fiji’s multi-party 
cabinet rules, drawing nine senior FLP par-
liamentarians into cabinet, and giving them 
major portfolios. It proved an enormously 
popular decision, but Fiji’s political lead-
ers again failed to make the arrangements 
work. Chaudhry stayed out of cabinet, and 
eventually expelled two of the participating 
FLP ministers. The shortlived 2006 power-
sharing cabinet was the first government 
since independence to have brought mem-
bers from country’s two largest parties—one 
representing the Fijians and the other the Fiji 
Indians—into cabinet (Green 2009). It lasted 
just seven months before being overthrown 
by military commander Frank Bainimarama. 
In New Caledonia, by contrast, power-
sharing provisions agreed as part of the 1998 
Noumea Accord worked more smoothly, even 
if they left the pro-independence parties in 
a minority. In all post-accord cabinets, the 
loyalist parties dominated, based on their 
ascendancy in the more densely populated 
Southern Province and their ability to gain 
a minority of seats in the majority Kanak 
Northern Province. During the initial post-
Noumea Accord government, the pro-inde-
pendence groups regularly took legal action 
regarding the composition of government. 
However, after the 2001 assumption of the 
Presidency by the RPCR’s Pierre Frogier, 
Kanak activist Déwé Gorodé was selected as 
Vice President, thus meeting one of the major 
FLNKS demands. The 2004 election saw a 
fracturing amongst the loyalist parties, with 
the emergence of Avenir Ensemble, a trend 
continued at the 2009 election, with further 
splits this time affecting Avenir Ensemble. 
Pro-independence parties have also been 
prone to schisms. The other Noumea Accord 
provisions of devolution of powers from Paris 
to Noumea, and a rebalancing of income 
towards the predominantly Kanak Northern 
and Loyalty Islands Provinces have helped to 
encourage the emergence of new alignments 
also among the Kanak parties. 
New Caledonia’s arrangements had a 
more solid foundation than those in Fiji. 
Provisions for the proportional distribution 
of ministerial appointments fitted better with 
New Caledonia’s list PR electoral system 
than with Fiji’s majoritarian AV system. Fiji’s 
Westminster-based 1997 constitution was 
not sufficiently redrafted after the belated 
inclusion of the 10 per cent rule, and drafters 
did not fully consider the likely difficulties of 
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a Prime Minister needing to form a coalition 
government to “command a majority” on the 
floor of the house while at the same time 
being required to form a power-sharing cabi-
net that includes all the qualifying parties. 
Whereas Fiji’s power-sharing rule generated 
bipolar incentives for each ethnic group to 
avoid splits that might entail parties falling 
below the 10 per cent threshold required 
for cabinet participation, New Caledonia’s 
rules allowed smaller parties to combine 
with larger parties to boost cabinet entitle-
ments. New Caledonia’s arrangements were 
considerably assisted by French aid subven-
tions, and by a growing flexibility emanating 
from Paris as regards which institutions 
might prove acceptable. Fiji had to tackle its 
problems alone, with little in the way of help-
ful advice from supranational institutions or 
powerful neighbours. 
CONClusION:  
pOstCOlONIAl trENds
After decolonisation, the new Pacific nations 
tended to experience a brief honeymoon 
period, presided over by a generation of 
relatively strong national leaders; Fiji’s Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara, PNG’s Michael Somare, 
Vanuatu’s Walter Lini, Amata Kabua in 
Marshall Islands, Ieremai Tabai in Kiribati or 
Nauru’s Hammer de Roburt. The late 1980s 
and 1990s saw the demise of that initial 
postcolonial optimism. Fiji witnessed its first 
coup in 1987, and a year later the Bougainville 
civil war began in earnest. New Caledonia 
erupted into conflict in the mid-1980s until 
tensions were calmed by the 1988 Matignon 
and then 1998 Noumea Accords. Vanuatu’s 
bipolar party system began to fracture in 
the late 1980s, and intense government 
instability reigned across the 1990s. For later 
decolonisers, like Tuvalu, the watershed was 
also later; the two elections of 1993 proved 
the catalyst for an end to the early era of 
stability, after which the fall of governments 
became more frequent.17 In the Marshall 
Islands, it was the death of Amata Kabua 
in 1996 that ended a hitherto unipolar style 
of government with no genuine opposition, 
and precipitated the opening of a period 
of sharper rivalry between the deceased 
President’s successor, Imata Kabua and the 
opposition UDP led by a commoner, Kessai 
Note. 
In the western Melanesian countries, 
heightened instability during the 1990s was 
encouraged by increasing interest from 
foreign companies in the natural resource 
extractive sectors. The Solomon Islands 
government remained reasonably stable until 
Solomon Mamaloni’s second government, 
when most ministers acquired strong links 
with logging companies (Frazer 1997: 41). 
The political links of mining and forestry 
companies became increasingly important 
in PNG politics, particularly around election-
time. Growing popular discontent with 
parliamentary processes was indicated by 
high casualty rates among elected MPs. 
Issues of corruption became a focal point for 
the assembly of loose opposition coalitions; 
the reformist governments that took power 
in Solomon Islands under Francis Billy Hilly 
in 1993 and under Bartholomew Ulufa’alu in 
1997 both tried to define themselves through 
opposition to the “Mamaloni men”. Even in 
Tonga, where the monarchy remained in 
charge, in the 1990s, ’Akilisi Pohiva and the 
other pro-democracy activists turned from 
agitation against abuses of office to radical 
demands for a shift away from royal control 
over government. Only Samoa remained 
reasonably stable, as the Human Rights 
Protection Party (HRPP) saw off challenges 
from the Tūmua and Pule movement in 1994 
and consolidated its grip on state power. 
Does the closing of the post indepen-
dence honeymoon era represent a shift to 
permanent volatility, or merely a hiatus before 
some new leadership consolidation? Efforts 
by elites to stabilise and regiment the politi-
cal order have been most ambitious in PNG, 
with OLIPPAC and “grace periods”, but, as 
we have seen, similar devices are being 
experimented with in Solomon Islands and 
have been tried, unsuccessfully, in Vanuatu. 
Samoa’s HRPP is the only political party 
across the region which has remained in 
office for close to a quarter of a century, con-
solidating its control by expanding cabinet 
size, increasing the parliamentary term to five 
years, outlawing party switching and creating 
   Oceania’s Political Institutions and Transitions
13
new sub-ministerial positions for pro-govern-
ment backbenchers. Solomon Islands and 
Tuvalu have sought to increase cabinet size, 
so as to render the executive more resilient 
to parliamentary challenge. Whether those 
efforts prove successful, whether they prove 
harbingers of emergence of more authori-
tarian political elites or whether the post-
independence era’s highly contested and 
fluid styles of politics reassert their influence 
remains to be seen. 
ENdNOtEs
1. An earlier version of this paper was 
published in Levine 2009.
2.  Based on data from the US Summer Insti-
ute of Linguistics, Ethnologue: Languages 
of the World website, <http://www.
ethnologue.com/ethno_docs/distribution.
asp?by=area>, accessed 10/11/2010.
3. “ ‘Colonisation has no place in Today’s 
World,’ says Secretary-General’, in 
Message to Decolonisation Seminar in 
Indonesia”, United Nations Secretary 
General  message, SG/SM/11568 GA/ 
COL/3171, 14 May 2008,  <http://www.un. 
org/News/Press/docs//2008/sgsm11568.
doc.htm>, accessed 10/11/2010.
4. For background on the constitution- 
making process, Ghai 1983.
5. The Congress of Micronesia also broke 
up into Commonwealth of the Northern 
Marianas, Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, Palau and Federated States of 
Micronesia, but the former was always 
a US-Controlled Trust territory, not an 
independent state. 
6. New Caledonia’s 1988 Matignon Accord 
put off the scheduled independence vote 
for a decade. However, in 1998, parties 
signed the Noumea Accord which put 
the scheduled independence vote back 
further, to some point between 2014 and 
2019. Bougainville’s peace agreement 
provides that there will be a vote on 
independence at some point between 
2015 and 2020. 
7.  AV is often called instant runoff voting in 
the US due to this characteristic.
8. Ratu Epeli Ganilau was not reappointed 
as a government nominee to the Great 
Council of Chiefs in 2004 consequently 
also losing his position as Chair. Ratu 
Epeli Nailatikau lost his position as 
Speaker after the May 2006 election and 
was to become Ambassador to Malaysia, 
until the 2006 coup intervened. Both 
men joined the post-2006 coup interim 
cabinet. 
9.  A term coined by Fiji’s Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara (although it has other claimants), 
and used to convey a familiar set of 
contrasts, such as relaxed timekeeping, 
a preference for leisure over work 
and consensus over confrontation, 
felt to distinguish the Pacific from the 
industrialised societies. Similar ideas 
are found in the Caribbean and Indian 
Ocean Islands.
10. For a survey of political parties across the 
region, see Fraenkel 2006a.
11. From the 1966 election until the 1987 polls, 
the Alliance Party, in 1992 and 1994 the 
Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) 
and from the 2001 polls Laisenia Qarase’s 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua. The 
exception was the 1999 elections, when 
the SVT managed only 38 per cent of 
the Fijian vote, with the remainder split 
among four other parties. 
12. First the National Federation Party and 
then the Fiji Labour Party.
13. Special Reference by Fly River Provincial 
Executive Council; Re Organic Law 
on Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates, Supreme Court of Papua 
New Guinea, 7 July 2010. 
14.Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Engineering polit-
ical stability in Solomon Islands:  Outcomes 
Report”, Perspectives series, Sydney: 
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
October 2008, <http://www.lowyinstitute.
org/Publication.asp?pid=917>, accessed 
10/11/2010. For a video-recorded debate 
on these issues between Ben Reilly, Jenny 
Hayward-Jones, Jon Fraenkel and Nicole 
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George, see Panel on Political Change 
Across Melanesia, December 2008, 
available at ANU Crawford School of 
Economics website, <http://www.crawford.
anu.edu.au/video/f lash/ index.php>, 
accessed 10/11/2010.
15. Women in National Parliaments, data 
from Inter-Parliamentary Union website, 
<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>, 
accessed 10/11/2010. The other states 
with zero women members are Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Belize. The 
IPU dataset records only states that 
are members of the United Nations, 
not territories like American Samoa and 
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas 
that also have zero female MPs. 
16. This is discussed in further detail in 
Fraenkel 2006b. 
17. For details, see Panapa and Fraenkel, 
2008.
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